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ABSTRACT
Vehicular network architectures are being reviewed and re-designed
to meet requirements for increasing data rates and exibility driven
in part by the adoption of Connected and Automated Vehicles
(CAV) strategies. A progressive move from traditional bus based
networks, such as CAN, to Ethernet-based network architectures is
being considered across the automotive industry. In this paper we
advocate for an in-vehicle Soware-Dened Network architecture
and discuss benets that such a shi in the architectural paradigm
will bring by strengthening cyber-security defences and enabling a
fail-operational capability through network programmability and
provably correct networks.
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1 INTRODUCTION
e evolution of in-vehicle, bus-based network architectures is
being challenged by the requirements for increasing performance
and exibility of emerging in-vehicle functionality and vehicle-to-
X connectivity to the outside world. e increase in bandwidth
required for new Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS),
Connected and Automated Vehicles (CAVs) and infotainment has
motivated the study of Ethernet as an in-vehicle network protocol,
[1], bringing advantages with respect to bandwidth availability,
exibility of a switched network and extensive industrial experience.
Ethernet can be integrated within the vehicle network either as
the backbone network that inter-connects existing bus networks or
fully replacing existing networks and having all vehicle’s Electronic
Control Units (ECUs) communicating via Ethernet (Figure 1).
In-vehicle networks and systems are increasingly becomingmore
complex, transforming the vehicle itself into a small cloud, where
data collection and processing is continuous. In-vehicle services,
such as infotainment or real-time remote diagnostics, which would
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also require access to the Internet are becoming reality. Such ser-
vices could be provided by dierent providers and require dier-
ent access rights to systems and components of the vehicle. is
would greatly benet by the ability to slice the network to dierent
providers eciently and correctly. At the same time, the connection
of vehicles to the outside world introduces them to cyber-security
threats. Whilst the performance choices for the introduction of
real-time Ethernet are being actively studied, there has been lile
discussion on the impact of an Ethernet-based network architecture
on the cyber-resilience of the vehicle.
e requirements for an automotive network are continually
evolving, however there are general principles that can be used to
assess the advantages and disadvantages of a proposed network
architecture.
(1) Functionality and requirement for real-time communica-
tion guarantees.
(2) Safety: automated vehicles increasingly need to be fail
operational.
(3) Cyber-security: networks designed with cyber-security in
mind from the outset.
(4) Robustness to electrically noisy environments in vehicle.
(5) Cost of the silicon within ECUs, shielded cabling, robust
connectors, development eort.
(6) Future proof: vehicle product life is signicantly longer
than consumer electronics.
In this paper, we advocate for an in-vehicle Soware-Dened
Network (SDN) architecture as an enabling network technology
for CAVs. Network programmability enables the introduction of
advanced communication services into the vehicle but also commu-
nication with external entities. SDN also enables the verication of
network properties and invariants [4], which in turn enables the
provision of a cyber-secure network environment for services to
communicate to each other and interoperate. In combination with
real-time Ethernet, SDN could lead to a network infrastructure that
is capable of supporting real-time network services together with
bandwidth hungry applications in a secure and ecient fashion.
2 IN-VEHICLE SDN ARCHITECTURE
e introduction of automotive Ethernet provides an opportunity
to review the overall vehicle network architectures. Replacing
existing bus networks with Ethernet may address some bandwidth
challenges and support new ADAS features, but this would miss
an opportunity to take advantage of additional benets a Soware
Dened Network could bring to an in-vehicle network that are
described in this Section. e in-vehicle SDN would interface the
external networks via a secure gateway, as illustrated in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: In-vehicle ethernet with SDN replacing traditional
CAN/LIN/Flexray buses. A secure gateway provides V2X
communication to the cloud.
2.1 Dynamic recongurability
A soware-dened in-vehicle network would be dynamically re-
congurable providing opportunities to; 1) locally recongure the
network in response to the diagnosis of a faulty component and
2) to recongure the network in response to a centralised analysis
based in the OEMs cloud, e.g. to improve network performance or
deal with a recently identied defect. Dynamic recongurability is
a central element of a fail operational approach that will be required
as CAVs move to SAE levels 3 and 4 [5].
2.2 Firewalling
An SDN architecture provides a robust and exible mechanism that
protects the vehicle’s systems from external threats, allowing for
ne-grained control over which network ows and external users
can access specic parts of the network. Such a facility, along with
being able to slice the network, provides a very strong mechanism
for protecting crucial systems in the vehicle. is is increasingly
signicant as ECU’s move to over the air updates.
2.3 Network Slicing and Flow Isolation
e future of in-vehicle networks is one where multiple applica-
tions with dierent bandwidth, latency and jier requirements run
in parallel (in and out of the vehicle) and access dierent in-vehicle
systems. e network should be able to support QoS dierentiation
which, in turn, would require network ows to be isolated from
each other. Moreover, dierent applications will be trusted dier-
ently by the in-vehicle network, and therefore there would have
to be a way to slice the network at the physical level or otherwise
provide explicit QoS guarantees to specic network ows. ese
functionalities can be supported by a SDN.
2.4 Programmable QoS and Real-Time Ethernet
Following on from the network slicing and ow isolation capabili-
ties oered by an in-vehicle SDN deployment, we emphasise the
capabilities of SDN for supporting dierent QoS classes, [6]. An
approach like the one followed in recent work on Soware-Dened
Radio for slicing [2] 5G networks, could enable the network opera-
tor (potentially the vehicle manufacturer and vehicle owner) and
applications (through the Northbound API) to eciently allocate
network resources to dierent applications.
2.5 SDN Verication
SDN assumes a logically centralised piece of soware that cong-
ures and operates the network. is centralisation opens up an
excellent opportunity for controlling the correctness of the oper-
ated soware and, consequently, the correctness of the network
being operated by it. During the past years, a plethora of techniques
and systems inspired by the soware verication worlds have been
proposed [3][4]. Network verication could be an extremely strong
driver of SDN in in-vehicle networks.
2.6 Impact of SDN on fail operational strategies
e ability to fail operational is important for CAVs since they do
not have the option of defaulting to a ‘safe’ state. Current electrical
and electronic architectures are built from ECUs that are congured
to specic tasks and may be located on xed network structures.
Many safety critical systems include network communications that
require redundancy. is can be extended with a SDN where the
controller can provide fail operational opportunities by being de-
signed to detect faults and re-congure the network to work around
the faults. In addition to responding to known faults, the SDN could
also be updated during the life of the vehicle to respond to new
faults that emerge and are logged in other similar vehicles.
3 FUTURE DIRECTIONS AND CHALLENGES
Automotive Ethernet is being progressively adopted in ADAS and
CAV development. e degree to which it replaces existing net-
works depends on conrmation of network performance and QoS
and quantied benets from its deployment. e benets may be
in terms of performance and bandwidth but can be signicantly
increased by combining with a SDN. is brings additional benets
of being able to recongure the network dynamically, verication
of the network ows, options for fail-operational behaviour and
new commercial models with slicing and partitioning that may
allow Tier 1 suppliers to operate in separate slices.
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